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May 23, 2005 Issue
Copyright © 2005 The American Conservative
Fathers Into Felons
No-fault divorce has turned a bastion of
private life into a colony of the state.
By Stephen Baskerville
By all indications, we are gearing up for a major
cultural and political war over the family. Opposition to
same-sex marriage has tapped a vein of grassroots outrage
that may run deeper than most observers imagine, with
implications extending to the welfare state, the judiciary,
and the most fundamental questions about the role of
government. Conservatives who warn that family breakdown
will lead to civilizational collapse sometimes seem
incapable of recognizing the fulfillment of their
prophecies.
The family crisis is generally attributed to
deteriorating moral norms stemming from the sexual
revolution. Yet the warfare over marriage is as much
political as cultural, though basic political questions are
conspicuously avoided: what precisely is the legal status
of marriage, and what is the appropriate role of the state
in private families and households? What are the relations
of church and state insofar as each claims authority over
marriage?
Family scholar Bryce Christensen likens the family crisis
to the Civil War, with constitutional implications that
could prove equally profound. G.K. Chesterton once
suggested that the family serves as the principal check on
government power and predicted that someday the two would
directly confront one another. Same-sex marriage is just
one indication that that day has arrived.
Another is the administration’s plan to redirect
welfare funds for marriage education. Adapting Clinton-era
fatherhood initiatives, the program is justified on the
principle that marriage is a public institution conferring
public benefits. “The time has come to recognize that
marriage is a public social good,” writes Alliance
for Marriage President Matt Daniels. “The health of
American families—built upon marriage—affects us
all.”
Yet the public nature of marriage is a truism that
requires some qualification. The common-law tradition has
long treated the family as a preserve of privacy that is
largely off-limits to government—what Justice Byron
White called a “realm of family life which the state
cannot enter.”
Family inviolability was never absolute, but the basic
principle has been established for centuries and most
emphatically in connection with what traditionalists point
out is the unique and foremost purpose of marriage: raising
children. The private family creates a legal bond between
parent and child that allows parents (within reasonable
limits) to raise their children free from government
interference. “Whatever else it may accomplish,
marriage acknowledges and secures the relation between a
child and a particular set of parents,” Susan Shell
writes in The Public Interest. “The right to
one’s own children … is perhaps the most basic
individual right—so basic we hardly think of
it.”
Federal courts have long recognized parenthood as a
“sacred” and “inherent, natural
right,” “far more precious than property
rights,” and “for the protection of which, just
as much as for the protection of the rights of the
individual to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,
our government is formed.” Shell summarizes
assumptions that, until recently, have been virtually
universal among free societies: “No known government,
however brutal or tyrannical, has ever denied, in fact or
principle, the fundamental claim of parents to their
children. …A government that distributed children
randomly … could not be other than tyrannical. Even
if it had the best interest of society in mind … a
government that paid no regard to the claims of biological
parenthood would be unacceptable to all but the most
fanatical of egalitarian or communitarian
zealots.”
As a statement of society’s moral consensus
Shell’s point is unexceptionable. Yet it also
illustrates the ignorance pervading current debates. For
current marriage law has both validated her point and
negated her fact: “No known government” ever
crossed this line until about 30 years ago, well before
same-sex marriage, when most of the Western democracies did
so. It is having precisely the consequences she
postulates.
Shell’s principle also highlights an anomaly
glossed over in official efforts to reverse family decline.
Invoking the public benefits of marriage to justify state
intervention in citizens’ private lives and even to
define—and potentially redefine—marriage would
appear self-defeating. “No one would argue that crime
and child poverty in America are not the business of
government,” writes Daniels. “And no one wants
to see the government turn a blind eye to the social trends
that are doing the most damage to American children.”
Daniels makes a powerful case, but he never distinguishes
the public’s interest from the state’s.
Government is not a neutral player.
Governments have always claimed control over marriage,
whether solemnized religiously or civilly. Some
libertarians now propose privatizing marriage as a strictly
civil contract. Yet whatever the state’s precise role
in marriage formation, politically it is far less important
than another question. The institutional strength of
marriage—and its connection with larger issues of
public policy—is determined not by the words through
which a marriage is formed but by the deeds through which a
marriage is dissolved.
Here the critical players, as both sides recognize, are
not homosexuals but heterosexuals. “The problem today
is not gay couples wanting to get married,” writes
Jonathan Rauch. “The threat to marriage is straight
couples not wanting to get married or … not staying
married.” The demand to recognize same-sex marriage
is clearly a symptom of how weakened marriage has already
become.
It is futile to try to assess the strength of marriage as
an institution or understand its civic role without
confronting its nemesis: divorce. Though traditionalists
decry efforts to redefine marriage, the fundamental
redefinition has already been effected by the
little-understood system of “no-fault”
divorce.
Some three decades ago, the Western world embarked on one
of the boldest experiments in its history. With no public
discussion of the implications, laws were enacted in
virtually every jurisdiction that effectively ended marriage
as a legal contract. Regardless of the terms by which a
marriage is entered, government officials can now, at the
request of one spouse, simply dissolve it over the objection
of the other and with no penalty to the moving party.
Maggie Gallagher titled her 1996 book The Abolition of
Marriage. It is difficult to see how same-sex marriage
can weaken an institution that has been abolished, nor how a
constitutional amendment can protect a contract that is
already unenforceable.
Divorce and unmarried childbearing have political
consequences we are only beginning to understand since they
serve as major engines for the overall expansion of
government. Daniels is undeniably correct that family
dissolution breeds social ills for governments to solve:
violent crime, drug abuse, and truancy are directly
attributable to family breakdown and fatherless homes. The
obvious political implications are studiously avoided.
“If we want less government, we must have stronger
families,” President Jimmy Carter once remarked,
“for government steps in by necessity when families
have failed.”
Carter may have perceived the cause and effect backward,
for it follows that government has a stake in failed
families and a motive to step in and declare failure when
given the opportunity. As Gallagher points out, this is
precisely what divorce courts do: “No-fault divorce
gave judges, at the request of one-half of the couple, the
right to decide when a marriage had irretrievably broken
down.”
If marriage is not wholly private, involuntary divorce by
its nature requires constant supervision over private life
by state officials. Marriage creates a private household,
which may or may not necessitate signing some legal
documents. Divorce dissolves not only a marriage but the
private household formed by it, usually over the objections
of one spouse. It inevitably involves state
functionaries—police and prisons—to enforce the
post-marriage order. Otherwise, one spouse might continue
to claim the protections and prerogatives of private life:
the right to live in the common home, to possess common
property, or to parent the common children. In the roughly
80 percent of divorces that are unilateral, state agents are
empowered, without further explanation, to remove innocent
people from their homes, confiscate their property, and take
away their children. Unilateral divorce dissolves not only
marriage but private life.
Politically, no-fault divorce did much more than allow
families to self-destruct. It permitted the state to assume
jurisdiction over the private lives of citizens who were
minding their own business and turn otherwise lawful private
behavior into crimes. This obviously carried consequences
far beyond family policy. Previously, a citizen could only
be incarcerated following conviction by a jury for violating
a specific statute, passed with citizen input and after
deliberation by elected legislators, that applied equally to
all. Suddenly, a citizen could be arrested and jailed
without trial for failing to live in conformity with an
order, formulated in a matter of minutes from limited
information by an unelected judge, that applied to no one
but himself and whose provisions might well be beyond his
ability to obey. A divorce decree amounted to a
personalized criminal code legislated ad hoc around
each former spouse, subjecting him to arrest for doing what
anyone else might lawfully do.
Unilateral divorce thus placed the family in a
legal-political status precisely the opposite of the
original purpose of marriage. Far from preserving a private
sphere of life immune from state intervention, involuntary
divorce opened private lives to unprecedented state
control.
The logic reaches its conclusion in directives recently
published by the American Law Institute (ALI). This
influential legal practitioners’ group announced on
its own authority that family-law jurisdiction would
henceforth encompass non-marital private arrangements such
as cohabiting couples, both heterosexual and homosexual, and
indeed all private homes.
Marriage defenders expressed outrage, but they
misunderstood the implications. As they now argue with
respect to same-sex marriage, traditionalists charged that
ALI was undermining marriage by blurring the distinction
between legitimate marriage and cohabitation. But ALI was
doing much more than this. Family-law practitioners were
using the toehold they had established in married households
through divorce law to extend government jurisdiction into
every household entailing an “intimate
relationship,” married or not. With breathtaking
irony, an “intimate relationship”—which
officials reserved for themselves to define—became not
a status off-limits to government scrutiny but the exact
opposite, one that gives government an entrée to
exert virtually unlimited supervision over personal life.
The abolition of marriage led directly to the abolition of
private life.
Compounding the irony, the factor that now invariably
justifies state intervention into the private sphere is the
very one that had previously required keeping the state
out—children. As with same-sex marriage, by ignoring
children a plausible case can be made that divorce harms no
one beyond the couple. Introducing children changes the
dynamic.
Prior to the divorce revolution, authority over children
had long been recognized to reside with their parents,
absent some infraction. “For centuries it has been a
canon of law that parents speak for their minor
children,” wrote Justice Potter Stewart. “So
deeply embedded in our traditions is this principle …
that the Constitution itself may compel a state to respect
it.” This too has been not only abrogated but
directly inverted by divorce law, which proceeds on the
opposite principle. As one analysis observes, “The
child’s best interest is perceived as being
independent of the parents, and a court review is held to be
necessary to protect the child’s interests.”
Divorce allows one parent to surrender both parents’
decision-making rights to the state.
As many have observed of marriage itself, the
introduction of children into marital politics brings
pressures for gender differentiation. Traditionally, as
Allan Carlson points out, governments set the terms of
marriage less to provide rights than to impose burdens, and
the ones Carlson enumerates all pertain to divorce:
“alimony, child custody, and the division of
property.” Significantly, these burdens were not
symmetrical; they all involved removing something from the
man. But they were accepted because in return the man
derived one vital protection from marriage: the right to
have children recognized as his. This too has become a
fiction.
Margaret Mead once observed that reinforcing the
parent-child bond has always been more necessary for fathers
than for mothers. Some modern conservatives insist that
marriage serves foremost to control male promiscuity. If
so, it does so as a product of its larger function: to
protect the father-child bond and with it the intact family.
This is evident today, as the weakening of marriage produces
fatherless, not usually motherless, homes. This point is
overlooked by today’s traditionalists, who argue that
marriage undergirds civilization, for it is the
father’s presence that signifies both the intact
family and, by the same measure, the civil institution.
Thomas Hobbes attributed to married fatherhood a central
role in the shift from the state of nature to civil society.
In nature, Hobbes argued, “the dominion is in the
mother”: “For in the condition of mere nature,
where there are no matrimonial laws, it cannot be known who
is the father, unless it be declared by the mother. And
therefore the right of dominion over the child dependeth on
her will and is consequently hers.”
Only in civil society—where “matrimonial
laws” do operate—is custody over children
shared with the father. Today, the different but
interchangeable labels used for similar family-promotion
schemes in the last two administrations implicitly recognize
that fatherhood (Clinton) and marriage (Bush) are
inseparable.
Traditionally, it has been marriage, not sperm, that
determines the father. This was the purpose behind Lord
Mansfield’s law stipulating that a child born within
wedlock is presumed to be that of the husband. It enabled a
marriage to survive the wife’s adultery. Here too,
no-fault divorce has inverted the effect. By supporting
what is now known as paternity fraud, Lord Mansfield’s
law has been transformed into an incentive to dissolve
rather than preserve families. By filing for divorce, the
adulterous wife, perhaps in collusion with the biological
father, can now collect child support from the cuckolded
husband for the children produced by the adultery.
Overwhelmingly, therefore, when children are involved,
the spouse on whom government power will be brought to bear
and who will experience the divorce regime’s growing
capacity to criminalize the involuntarily divorced is the
father. Some believe this is logical, and it would be
appropriate if, as popularly believed, the father is the one
dissolving the family. In fact, the divorcing parent today
is almost invariably the mother.
The failure of policymakers to confront this has further
criminalized private life through a panoply of repressive
measures against primarily (though not exclusively) fathers.
“The advocates of ever-more-aggressive measures for
collecting child support,” writes Christensen,
“have moved us a dangerous step closer to a police
state.” Devised as part of the welfare system to
compel payments by unmarried fathers, penal measures
pertaining to child support, domestic violence, and child
abuse have now spread to the middle class through divorce.
Justified to protect and provide for women and children once
the father is gone, they have mushroomed into an elaborate
machinery that serves to remove fathers and subsidize
fatherless homes.
Contrary to two decades of judicial and feminist
propaganda, no scientific data indicate that fathers are,
en masse, abandoning their families, beating their
wives, and molesting their children. On the contrary, the
evidence unambiguously establishes that a married household
is the least likely setting for these problems.
The family crisis widely accepted on the Right as well as
the Left is an optical illusion. What is advertised as an
epidemic of dissolute fathers increasingly reveals itself as
a power grab by a new class of political operatives who
created no-fault divorce and who share an interest in
displacing fathers and politicizing children. What makes it
diabolically successful is a capacity to silence opposition
and co-opt critics by claiming concern for children and
distributing largesse ostensibly for their benefit. Thus
camouflaged, the champions of other people’s children
make an end-run around more visible clashes over
homosexuality, pornography, abortion, and schooling. But
the bottom line remains: never before have governments
created a bureaucratic apparatus whose primary purpose is to
separate children from their parents.
The family crisis represents a microcosm of the larger
crisis of modern politics, for it is driven by a class of
political professionals whose livelihoods depend on
politicizing everything, including now the most intimate
corners of our lives. The government-occupied family is
only the beginning of the brave new world we have
created.
Stephen Baskerville is a professor at Howard
University.
May 23, 2005 Issue
According to the author:
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American Conservative.
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